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NOTES
DOES MOOTING OF THE NAMED PLAINTIFF
MOOT A CLASS SUIT COMMENCED
PURSUANT TO RULE 23 OF THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE?
I.

INTRODUCTION

No one can doubt the rapidly increasing utilization' of the class
action.' Yet, the relative novelty of any significant application of
this procedural weapon in federal jurisprudence has laid bare
various problems which not long ago had been obscured or wholly
concealed by less frequent utilization. One such problem, the subject of the present article, concerns the proper disposition of a class
action whose representative plaintiff has been rendered moot.
a)

The Concept of Mootness

At an early date,3 English courts delimited the judicial process
to cases presented in an adversary context and involving an actual
controversy.' In the United States, this delimitation was not judicially but constitutionally imposed, by the adjuration of article III,
section 2 restricting the federal judicial power to "cases" or "controversies. ' '5 In determining which suits fall within the scope of the
"case" or "controversy" requirement and hence within the ambit of
1. Such utilization of class actions was deterred somewhat by the Supreme Court in
Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969), where the Court held that class members could not
aggregate their individual claims to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement imposed
upon diversity and federal question cases in federal court. The impact of Snyder is lessened,
however, by the fact that its application does not extend to class actions initiated in state
court, or to federal class actions based upon a jurisdictional provision not requiring a claim
in excess of $10,000.
2. Note, Appealability of a Class Action Dismissal: The "Death Knell" Doctrine, 39 U.
Cm. L. REv. 403 (1972).
3. See Coxe v. Phillips, 95 Eng. Rep. 152 (1736), wherein the court held that an attempt
to conduct a fictitious lawsuit on fabricated issues was contempt of court.
4. See generally Diamond, FederalJurisdictionto Decide Moot Cases, 94 U. PA. L. REV.
125 (1945). Ihereinafter cited as Diamondl.
5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two
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federal judicial power, the courts have established the rule that they
have no power to decide "moot" cases.' In determining whether or
not a particular case is moot, the traditional test has been whether,
at all stages of the litigation, there is an "actual controversy, and
adverse interests." 7 Where there is no real dispute between the
plaintiff and defendant, either because the suit is seen to have been
collusive from its inception,' or through subsequent events an originally extant controversy has been extinguished, ' or where the questions sought to be reviewed are totally abstract,'" or the happening
of events has rendered it impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief," the cause will be treated as moot.
A finding of mootness is of fundamental significance, for it
connotes the absence of a "case" or "controversy"'" without which
a federal court is powerless to adjudicate. 3
or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens
of different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects.
See generally Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962);
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911); R. HARRIS, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED
STATES (1940); Borchard, Justiciability,4 U. Cm. L. REV. 1 (1936); Note, What Constitutes
a Case or Controversy Within the Meaning of Article III of the Constitution?, 41 H.Av. L.
REV. 232 (1927).
6. See North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971); Powell v. McCormick, 385 U.S.
486, 496 n.7 (1969); Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964); J. MICHAEL, THE
ELEMENTS OF LEGAL CONTROVERSY 94-117 (1948).

7. Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 251 (1850).
8. Id. Accord, United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 307 (1943). See also Chicago & G.T.
Ry. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339 (1892). In Wellman, the Supreme Court stated:
[Ilt never was thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the
legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the
legislature's act.
Id. at 345.
9. An actual controversy may be extinguished by subsequent events either by a change
in the conirolling [kict situation or a change in the existing law. See Diamond at 132-36.
10. E.g., Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U.S. 274 (1928); Hayburn's Case, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1796).
11. E.g., Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895).
12. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
13. See Diamond at 127, where it is stated: "When a court decides that a case before it
is moot, it ousts itself of jurisdiction." In Californiav. San Pablo & Texas Ry., 149 U.S. 308
(1893), the Supreme Court observed:
[This Court is not empowered to decidel moot questions or abstract propositions,
or to declare, for the government of future cases, principles or rules of law which
cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it.
Id. at 314.
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Account should be taken of the "exception" to the mootness
doctrine, which was conceived in Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v.
ICC. 4 There, plaintiffs sought judicial review of an adverse administrative order which by its terms expired after two years. Over
defendant's claim of mootness, the Supreme Court held that it had
jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy despite the expiration of
the specific order upon which plaintiffs had initiated suit, explaining that
Itihe questions involved in orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission are usually continuing . . .and their
consideration ought not to be, as they might be, defeated
by short term orders capable of repetition, yet evading review .... "
This exception to the mootness doctrine recognizes that certain recurrent claims are so intrinsically ephemerous that their review
would be effectively precluded under a strict application of the
mootness doctrine. Hence, an exception to application of the doctrine was devised, to accomodate plaintiffs whose claims were "capable of repetition, yet evading review."'"
The generally accepted reasons for the mootness doctrine are
easily stated. First is the basic precept of our jurisprudence that the
judicial process functions best in an adversary context, wherein all
claims are likely to be presented vigorously and extensively. It is
feared that if individuals without an adverse interest could litigate,
the adversary system would be prone to malfunction. 7 Secondly,
But cf. Alton & So. Ry. v. International Ass'n of Mach. & A.W., 463 F.2d 872 (D.C. Cir.
1972). In Alton, it was held that mootness is of two dimensions-constitutional and administrative, implying that federal courts often utilize mootness, apart from any constitutional
considerations, as a tool of judicial administration, enabling a court to pick and choose the
cases it desires to hear by application of the mootness doctrine.
14. 219 U.S. 498 (1911).
15. Id. at 515.
16. This principle has been applied in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (pregnancy); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (durational residency
requirements for voting).
17. R. BISCHOFF, SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 26-35 (E. Cahn ed. 1954); P.
FRUEND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 79-80, 84-88 (1954); Note, Mootness and
Ripeness: The PostmanAlways Rings Twice, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 867 (1965); Note, Cases Moot
on Appeal: A Limit on the Judicial Power, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 772 (1955). The latter Note
states, "This adversary system depends upon self interest as the motive best suited to bring
all pertinent facts, policies, and legal issues before the court." Id. at 773.
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there is the consideration of judicial economy.'" Thus, it is believed
that the function of the courts in resolving disputes is so timeconsuming and important, that they should not misuse their time
by passing on the merits of nondisputes. To do so, it is presumed,
would make an already overburdened judicial docket more onerous.

b)

19

Mootness in a Class Action Context

The class action was an invention of equity,2" to enable a court
to proceed to a decree in suits where the number of those interested
in the subject of the litigation was so great that their joinder as
parties in conformity to the usual rules of procedure would have
been impracticable, and where one or more members of the class
sued or was sued on behalf of all. 2 The prevailing recognition in
federal jurisprudence of the class action is found in Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The burgeoning occasions in
which t he parties involved in litigation are many, compounded with
the specter of a multiplicity of suits, has generated an increasing
utilization of the class action.2 1 Such recent utilization has revealed
18. See Notes, supra note 17.
19. Note, Moot Administrative Orders, 53 HARV. L. REv. 628, 629 (1940).
20. The class suit had its origins nearly three hundred years ago in the English Court
of Chancery, which developed the bill of peace to facilitate the adjudication of such disputes.
See City of London v. Richmond, 23 Eng. Rep. 870 (1701); How v. Tenants of Bromsgrove,
23 Eng. Rep. 277 (1681); Brown v. Vermuden, 22 Eng. Rep. 797 (1676). At an early time,
American federal courts authorized such suits. See, e.g., West v. Randall, 29 F. Cas. 718 (No.
17,424) (C.C.D.R.I. 1820). Because of their origin in the English Chancery Court, class suits
in the United States were originally of equitable cognizance only. The fusion of law and equity
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure made class actions in federal courts under Rule 23
available in cases at law as well as in actions in equity. See generally Z. CHAFEE, SOME
PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 220-42 (1950); Wheaton, Representative Suits Involving Numerous
Litigants, 19 CORNELL L.Q. 339 (1934).
21. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940).
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (a). as amended in 1966: prnvides
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common
to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.
23. Pomerantz. New )evelopments in Class Actions-Has Their Death Knell Been
Soundcd . 25 Bus. LAW. 1259 (1970).
The class action is mushrooming throughout the courts of our land. It has become
one of the most socially useful remedies in history. Millions of victims of securities
frauds, anti-trust violations and an endless variety of consumer wrongs are, thanks
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several hitherto latent problems. One such problem, the topic of this
note, concerns the question of whether a class action must be adjudged moot when the named plaintiff is so adjudged. Several,
though discordant, cases have considered this issue. It is to a survey
of these cases that the ensuing two sections are devoted.
I.

CASES HOLDING THAT THE MOOTING OF THE NAMED PLAINTIFF

DOES NOT MOOT THE CLASS ACTION

A great majority of pertinent cases have concluded that the
mooting of the named plaintiff does not render a class action moot.
Such a conclusion has typically been reached via application of one
of a variety of policies and fictions, which have been judicially fashioned to circumvent the mootness doctrine. The devices most commonly employed are amenable to the categorization of the following
subsections. Their propriety will be considered in section V.
a)

Mootness Is Determined at the Inception of the Class Action

An undisguised fiction which various courts have seized upon
to avoid pronouncing a class action moot when the named plaintiff
is so adjudged, is to simply hold that if the named plaintiff is a
competent litigant at the commencement of the class suit, he remains so throughout, to the extent that his subsequent mootness
will be of no effect either upon himself or upon the class action.
Illustrative of this sophistry is the recent case of Moss v. Lane
Co., Inc.2" Therein, a suit for class and individual relief was filed
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.2" Subsequent to the
filing of the suit, but before a final determination, the named plaintiff's individual claim was dismissed on the ground that there was
no showing that he had been personally discriminated against. The
trial court accordingly dismissed the entire case, under the assumption that the dismissal of the individual claim took with it the class
action.2" On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
to the class action device, now able to gain access to our courts.
Id. at 1259.
24. 471 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1973).
25. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), prohibits employers
in any industry affecting commerce and employing twenty-five or more employees from
discriminating in employment practices on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin.
26. 471 F.2d at 855.
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exhorting that if the plaintiff were a member of the class at the
commencement of the action and his competency as a representative then determined or assumed, the subsequent dismissal or mooting of his individual claim should not operate to render moot the
27
action of the class.
Moss is not without precedential underpinnings. In Gaddis v.
Wyman,2" plaintiff Gaddis filed a class action in federal district
court, assailing section 139(a) of the New York Social Services Law
as violative of the equal protection clause. This statute required
social service officials to deny public assistance to any person who
applied for such assistance within one year of his or her arrival in
the state. After filing the suit, plaintiff's attorney was informed that
despite section 139(a), plaintiff would thereafter receive assistance.
As a result of this change in circumstances, defendant moved to
dismiss the class action on the ground that the entire case was
mooted by the mooting of the sole named plaintiff. The district
court rejected defendant's theory, holding that the mooting of plaintiff Gaddis did not render the class action moot, since "when the
action was commenced . . . Gaddis was properly a representative
of the purported class.""
To the same effect is Gatling v. Butler.0 Gatling had been
declared a "delinquent" by a Connecticut juvenile court. She
sought review of this pronouncement in a Connecticut superior
court, but was prevented from doing so by her inability to comply
with a state statute requiring the payment of a fee as a prerequisite
to the docketing of an appeal. Gatling initiated a class action in the
Connecticut District Court, alleging that this statute constituted an
abridgment of her fourteenth amendment rights. While the federal
action was pending, Gatling was informed by state officials that she
had been granted leave to file her appeal in the superior court without payment of the fee. Defendant thereupon moved for dismissal
of the class action on the ground that the waiving of the fee requirement as to Gatling effectively mooted both her and the class which
she alone represented. The district court, in denying defendant's
motion, reasoned that Gatling must be deemed to have been a pro27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
304 F. Supp. 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
Id. at 715.
52 F.R.D. 389 (D. Conn. 1971).
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per representative of the class from the time the suit was initiated. 3
As such, the court implied, any subsequent mooting of Gatling's
individual interest would not affect her competency to represent the
32
class, and hence, could have no effect upon the class action itself.
In Thomas v. Clarke,"3 plaintiff had filed a class action challenging the constitutionality of a Minnesota statute providing that
any person who had instituted an action to replevy personalty could
obtain immediate possession of such property at any time prior to
defendant's answer. Settlement of the state court replevin action in
which plaintiff had been involved, defendant argued, mooted plaintiff's claim and thereby rendered the class action moot. The Minnesota District Court, citing Gatling3' and Gaddis," held that where
the named plaintiff is a member of the class which he purports to
represent at the commencement of that suit, he is a proper representative and remains so throughout the litigation.
The preceding four decisions represent one of many prevailing
schools of juridical thought concerning the proper disposition of a
class suit whose representative plaintiff has been mooted. Under
this view, the competency of the representative in a class suit is
determined at the commencement of such a suit, with the
consequence that subsequent mooting of the representative is of no
effect either upon him or upon the class which he represents.:"
b) C'lass Suits in Which the Controversy Is "Capable of Repetition, Yet Evading Review"
31. Id. at 395.
32. Id.
33. 54 F.R.D. 245 (D. Minn. 1971).
34. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
35. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
36. Contra, Carroll v. Associated Musicians, 316 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1963). In Carroll,
plaint ill orchest ra leaders brought a class action to enjoin defendant union from collecting
surcharges. taxes and welfare payments. After the class action had been instituted, the
rlresentative plaintill's were expelled from the union. As such, they were no longer required
t o make t he challenged payments. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that as a result
m real controversy existed as between the named plaintiffs and the defendant union. It
accordingly dismissed the entire suit. See also Sawyers v. Grand Lodge, LAM., 279 F. Supp.
747 (El..Mo. 1967). There. a local union ollicer filed a class suit alleging that his dues and
those of the class which he purported to represent had been increased illegally. The named
plaintill was a competent representative at the commencement of the class action, though
he was subsequent lv expelled from the union. Relying on Carroll,the district court concluded
that where a representative plaintiff is mooted after the institution of the class suit, he is not
c'mpetent to represent the class.
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The established exception to the mootness doctrine, which permits courts to adjudicate seemingly moot controversies which are
"capable of repetition, yet evading review, 3' 7 has been applied in
the class action context to sustain the competency of a seemingly
moot representative plaintiff, and thereby the class he purports to
represent. Illustrative of this utilization of the mootness exception
is the recent United States Supreme Court decision of Roe v.
Wade.31 Roe, a pregnant woman, had initiated a class suit in a
specially convened three-judge federal district court challenging the
constitutionality of the Texas abortion laws. She appealed an order
of the three-judge court that had granted declarative but denied
injunctive relief directly to the Supreme Court. During the pendency of this appeal, Roe's pregnancy was naturally terminated.
Appellee thereupon urged that since the representative plaintiff's
claim had become moot, the entire class suit should be dismissed
as moot. The Supreme Court, disagreeing with appellee, concluded
that the termination of Roe's pregnancy did not moot her individual
claim, and consequently, neither was the class action mooted. It
observed,
If . . . the termination of pregnancy makes a case moot,
pregnancy litigation seldom will survive much beyond the
trial stage, and appellate review will be effectively denied.
Our law should not be that rigid. . . . Pregnancy provides
a classic justification for a conclusion of nonmootness. It
truly could be "capable of repetition, yet evading review." 3
A similar result was reached in Torres v. New York State Department of Labor."' Plaintiff had individually brought an action in
federal court challenging as violative of due process various sections
of the New York Labor Law4 which authorized the termination of
unemployment compensation benefits without a prior hearing.
While the s.it. wa. pencling, defenrh.nt, grnnted plaintiff a hearing,
at which the termination of plaintiff's welfare payments was upheld. Following the determination of this hearing, plaintiff moved
in the district court for an order declaring that his action could
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id.at 125.
318 F. Supp. 1313 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
N.Y. LABOR LAW §§ 597, 598, 620 (McKinney 1965).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol8/iss2/6

et al.: Does Mooting of the Named Plaintiff Moot a Class Suit Commenced P

19741

MOOTNESS

proceed as a class action. Defendant opposed this request on the
ground that plaintiff was no longer competent to represent a class
of persons challenging pre-hearing termination of benefits, because
he himself had received a full-fledged hearing, and that as a result,
the entire matter was moot. The district court held that the action
could proceed as a class action and that plaintiff was a proper representative of the class. It seemed impressed with the fact that in
several other cases the defendant satisfied the named plaintiff's
individual grievance and then urged that the case was moot, or not
appropriate as a class action for lack of a representative plaintiff.2
Seemingly impelled by such evidence, the court continued:
In cases such as this there is a conceivable danger that the
defendants could always grant the named plaintiff a hearing and then claim that the matter is moot. . in an effort
to evade a judicial determination. 3
Such cases evidence a second means by which courts have
breathed vitality into what appears, under traditional concepts, to
be a moot case. Thus the competency of a representative plaintiff
will be sustained, and thereby the class which he represents, where
the conduct or conditions which seemingly moot his individual
claim are "capable of repetition, yet evading review."'"
c)

A Judicial Gallimaufry

The remaining cases reaching a result analogous to that of the
above subsections represent a m6lange of circumstances and
ratiocinations, incapable of categorization.
Some courts, if they perceive a willful effort by the defendant
42. 318 F. Supp. at 1317.
43. Id. at 1318.
44. See note 15 supra and accompanying text. Accord, Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814
(1968); Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969) (Brennan, J., dissenting); cf. Vaughan v. Bower, 313
F. Supp. 37 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd mem., 400 U.S. 884 (1970). In Vaughan, defendant moved
to dismiss plaintiff's class action, in which plaintiff represented mentally incompetent inmates of the Arizona State Hospital who were not residents of Arizona and who were returned
to their native states pursuant to a state law authorizing such transfer, on the ground that it
had been rendered moot by the absence of any persons in the class which plaintiff purported
to represent. The court denied defendant's motion. Observing that each year thirty to thirtyfive patients were returned to their respective states under the statute, it concluded that it
was the very administrative action challenged which produced the short life of the class
plaintiff wished to represent, and that hence, "what is involved . . .is a problem capable of
repetition, yet evading review." 313 F. Supp. at 40.
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to render a class action moot by granting the named plaintiff the
relief he individually seeks, fall back upon the pronouncement of the
Supreme Court in United States v. WT. Grant, Co.:4"
Voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not
deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the
case, i.e., does not make the case moot.4"
This pronouncement was applied in Davis v. Caldwell, 7 a case
involving a class suit challenging the Georgia workmen's compensation law.4" The defendant in Davis had granted to the representative
plaintiff the relief she individually sought, thereafter moving to dismiss the entire action as moot for want of a competent representative. The specially convened three-judge district court, wanting no
part of this machination, declared that the defendants could not be
allowed to moot this case by the use of a "resist and withdraw"
technique. Were this not so, a defendant's economic power would
enable him "to avoid decisions such as the one sought here, by
settling individual claims." 49
The Grant ruling has been applied by several courts in cases
involving class actions challenging racial discrimination. This occurred in Smith v. YMCA of Montgomery." Plaintiffs, who had
been denied admission to a YMCA day camp allegedly on account
of race, brought a class suit in federal court, seeking an injunction
prohibiting the YMCA from operating any of its programs in a racially discriminatory way. Shortly after the suit was filed, defendant
notified plaintiffs that they had been accepted as members in the
day camp program. Defendant then moved to dismiss the action as
moot. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that mootness was
not so easily established, reasoning that subsequent remedial actions taken allegedly to avoid a cause of action strongly mitigate
against a finding of mootness, particularly where the plaintiffs present a prima facie showing of raciai discrimination.' i
To the same effect is Cypress v. Newport News General and
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

345 U.S. 629 (1952).
Id. at 632.
53 F.R.D. 373 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 114-703, 114-709 (1973).
53 F.R.D. at 376.
462 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1972).
Id.at 645.
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Nonsectarian Hospital Association.2 Cypress, a black doctor,
brought a class action challenging the racially discriminatory policies of the defendant hospital, claiming that it denied black doctors
staff privileges. During an appeal from a district court ruling adverse to plaintiff, defendant granted Cypress active staff privileges,
later citing this development in support for a motion to dismiss the
appeal as moot. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decided
against defendant on the mootness question, finding as "suspect, to
say the least" the fact that defendant, a few weeks before the case
was heard on appeal, voluntarily reversed a whole history of racial
discrimination in granting Cypress staff privileges.",
Perhaps the principal case dealing with the proper disposition
of a class suit challenging alleged racial discrimination, and whose
representative plaintiff has been rendered moot, is Jenkins v.
United Gas Corp.5" Jenkins, after having been denied a promotion
by defendant, instituted a class action in district court, alleging
systematic racial discrimination by defendant in his hiring and promotion practices, in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act."5 Within a few weeks after the institution of the suit, defendant
offered .Jenkins a promotion, which was accepted. Defendant then
moved to dismiss the entire cause as moot. Jenkins appealed from
the district court order granting defendant's motion.5 6 The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. It cited Grant,5 7 indicating that
voluntary remedial action by defendant, in satisfying the representative plaintiff's individual claim, should not render the entire action
moot. The court, unwilling to bottom its decision on this precedent,
proceeded to an analysis of Title VII. It concluded that because the
actual enforcement of this provision was left largely up to the individual plaintiff who was discriminated against, he in effect became
"a private attorney general" through whom congressional policies
could be effectuated." It noted further that:
[This] suit is therefore more than a private claim by the
52.
53.
54.
it is the
55.
56.
57.
58.

375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967).
Id. at 658.
400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968). Jenkins is perhaps the principal case in the sense that
most commonly cited.
See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
261 F. Supp. 762 (E.D. Tex. 1966).
See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
400 F.2d at 33.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1974

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 [1974], Art. 6

344

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8

employee seeking the particular job which is at the bottom
of the charge of unlawful discrimination . . . .[That] individual, often obscure, takes on the mantel of the sovereign.19
Invested with such judicially endowed power, Jenkins was deemed
a capable representative of the class, notwithstanding his recent
promotion. Such cases as Smith,"' Cypress," and particularly
Jenkin.s,'62

indicate a judicial proclivity towards nonmootness

where questions of racial discrimination are involved.63
The "importance" of the issues has been deemed sufficient justification by a few courts to reach a nonmootness concision as to the
representative plaintiff, and thereby to the class action itself. This
view is exemplified well by Kelly v. Wyman. 4 Several welfare recipients, having had their assistance terminated without a pretermination hearing, initiated a class suit attacking the state laws
which sanctioned such procedure. During the pendency of the litigation, the representative plaintiffs began receiving public assistance
on an emergency basis, which prompted defendant's motion to dismiss the entire action as moot. The court, declining defendant's
motion, held that judicial determination of questions of such importance could not thus be evaded.65
59. Id. at 32.
60. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
61. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
62. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
63. Accord, Rackley v. Board of Trustees, 238 F. Supp. 512 (E.D.S.C. 1965); McSwain
v. Board of Educ., 138 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Tenn. 1956). Contra, Heard v. Mueller Co., 464
F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1972).
If the results in Jenkins and Cypress were due primarily to the presence in those cases
of racial discrimination, as is here suggested, then certain subsequent cases which anchored
themselves to those decisions may have been improvidently decided. Thus, Vaughan v.
Bowers, 313 F. Supp. 37 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd mem., 400 U.S. 884 (1970), involved a class
action chaiienging the cons 6iiuionality of a state jaw permitting non-residenial illiidLeS of
state hospitals to be sent back to their native states, yet, the court based its ruling on Jenkins.
Similarly, in Rivera v. Freeman,469 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1972), the court based its conclusion
of nonmootness on Jenkins and Cypress, though the case before it involved the constitutionality of a state juvenile detention statute, not racial discrimination. And, in Thomas v.
Clarke, 54 F.R.D. 245 (D. Minn. 1971), the court rested a conclusion of nonmootness as to
the representative plaintiff on the Jenkins and Cypress precedents, though the case before it
dealt with the constitutionality of a state replevin statute.
64. 294 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd sub nom., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970).
65. 294 F. Supp. at 890. Accord, Torres v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 318 F. Supp.
1313 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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The various devices elucidated in this and the preceding two
subsections all avoided a holding of mootness as to the class action
by perpetuating the representative plaintiff's competency, despite
his apparent mootness under traditional concepts. Such devices
were doubtless a product of a fear that a conclusion of mootness as
to the representative plaintiff would necessitate the same conclusion as to the class suit itself. That such a fear was not unwarranted
is indicated by the ensuing section.
III.

CASES HOLDING THAT THE MOOTING OF THE NAMED PLAINTIFF
MOOTS THE CLASS ACTION

A few courts have refused to utilize fictions in order to animate
their predilictions concerning the proper treatment of a class action
whose representative plaintiff has become moot. Rather than perpetuate the competency of a moot plaintiff by employment of a
fiction, they find the representative plaintiff moot and conclude
that this renders the entire class action moot.
The two leading cases propounding this view are Hall v. Beals"
and Watkins v. Chicago Housing Authority.6 7 In Hall, plaintiffs had
moved to Colorado five months prior to the 1968 presidential election and were refused permission to vote in that election because of
a Colorado statute 8 making a six month residence in the state a
prerequisite to voting in a national election. Plaintiffs commenced
a class action assailing the constitutionality of this statute. A trial
court upheld the law's validity and, as a result, plaintiffs did not
vote in the 1968 election. During plaintiffs' appeal to the Supreme
Court, the Colorado legislature reduced the residency requirement
from six to two months. In a per curiam decision, expressing the
view of six Justices, the Court found the representative plaintiffs to
have been mooted by the change in state law, since under the new
provision the plaintiffs could have voted in the 1968 election. The
Court concluded that the entire case had therefore lost its character
as a present, live controversy,6 9 and accordingly dismissed the action
as moot.70
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

396 U.S. 45 (1969).
406 F.2d 1234 (7th Cir. 1969).
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49-24-1 (1963).
396 U.S. at 48.
Id. at 59.
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The preceding section demonstrates that the Supreme Court's
ruling in Hall has not been followed. A majority of courts clearly will
not allow the mootness doctrine to frustrate their inclinations concerning the proper disposition of a class action whose representative
plaintiff has, under traditional standards, been rendered moot.
Courts imbued with such conviction find distinguishing Hall no
7
uneasy task. '
In Watkins, several plaintiffs initiated a class suit in federal
court, challenging the constitutionality of clauses in the Chicago
Housing Authority's standard lease which gave the Authority the
power to evict public housing tenants at any time, with or without
cause, by giving five days notice. At the commencement of the suit,
all of the representative plaintiffs had been sued by the Authority
in state courts for failure to comply with eviction notices. The Authority, after initiation of the class suit, abandoned its litigation
against the named plaintiffs and reinstated them as tenants. It then
moved to dismiss the entire action as moot. The district court
granted the Authority's motion, and the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed. Judge Major, speaking for the court of appeals,
reasoned that where the representatives have received the relief
which they have individually requested and the case is therefore
moot with respect to them, no case or controversy exists with respect
to the class action either, which must likewise be dismissed as
moot.7
71. See generally Note, Developments in the Law of Federal Class Action Litigation-Catch 22 in Rule 23, 10 Hous. L. REv. 337 (1973).
72. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
73. Accord, Perkins v. Iowa Through Its Dep't of Social Servs., 465 F.2d 724 (8th Cir.
1972): Heard v. Mueller, 464 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1972); Heumann v. Board of Educ., 320 F.
Suplp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)).
,Judge Major's reasoning is extremely tenuous, particularly in respect to its indebtedness
to Gray v. Board of Trustees. 342 U.S. 517 (1952). Gray involved a class action commenced

by a number of blacks seeking to enjoin Tennessee school authorities from denying them
admission to the University of Tennessee. During the litigation, the named plaintiffs were
admitted to the school. Being thus informed, the Supreme Court dismissed the class action
as moot, on the ground that the representative plaintiffs had received the relief they had
requested-namely, admission to the University of Tennessee. Further, the Court in Gray
seemed to have made its conclusion dependent on the absence of any suggestion that other
blacks would not be afforded similar treatment. 342 U.S. at 518. In Watkins, neither factor
existed. The representative plaintiffs had not received the relief they requested, which was
an injunction against the Authority's standard lease and a declaration as to its unconstitutionality. Nor was there an absence of any suggestion that other persons would not be accorded similar treatment, for the standard lease remained in full force.
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The conclusions reached in Watkins and Hall evidence a deep
concern for adherence to traditional notions of mootness, doubtless
induced by an appreciation of the fundamental significance of the
mootness doctrine in our constitutional system. 4 For such courts,
the primacy of the mootness doctrine is not to be eroded by judicially created fictions fashioned solely to avoid a conclusion of mootness as to an otherwise moot representative plaintiff.
IV.

A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR ATTORNEYS

The cases elucidated in section II illustrate four means by
which courts have avoided a mootness conclusion as to a representative plaintiff and thereby the class which he represents. Under the
first approach, the competency of the representative plaintiff is de-'
termined at the commencement of the suit, with the consequence
that his subsequent mooting is of no effect upon either him or the
class he purports to represent. A second approach seized upon by
some courts to reach the same result, is to simply apply the established exception to the mootness doctrine of cases "capable of
repetition, yet evading review." ' 15 Thus the competency of the
representative plaintiff will be sustained, and thereby the class he
represents, where the circumstances which seemingly moot his individual claim are "capable of repetition, yet evading review." 6
Thirdly, some courts rely upon old dicta to the effect that voluntary
cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not render an action
moot." Lastly, a few courts have deemed that the mere importance
of proffered issues is sufficient justification for a conclusion of nonNevertheless, Watkins has been expressly followed by a few courts. See Jacobs v. Board
of School Comm'rs, 349 F. Supp. 605 (S.D. Ind. 1972); Callier v. Hill, 326 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.
Mo. 1970); Craddock v. Hill, 324 F. Supp. 183 (W.D. Mo. 1970). In Craddock, representative
plaintiffs in a class suit attacking excessive delay before determination of welfare eligibility,
were rendered moot by a final determination of eligibility which included the granting of
benefits lost due to the delay. The District Court for the Western District of Missouri held,
citing Watkins, that the class action was thereby rendered moot. But cf. Burg v. Feichter,
Civil No. 72 F 65 (N.D. Ind., filed Nov. 20, 1972) (Swygert, C.J., dissenting).
74. See note 13 supra and accompanying text. Of course, it is conceivable that such a
view may also be attributable to a Benthamesque disdain for legal fiction. See, e.g., 6 J.
BENTHAM, WORKS 582 (1843):
Not a fiction but is capable of being translated, and occasionally is translated, into
the language of truth. Burn the original ....
and employ the translation in its stead.
Fiction is no more necessary to justice, than poison is to sustenance.
75. See section II, subsection b, supra.
76. Id.
77. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
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mootness as to an otherwise moot representative plaintiff."
Such are four currently recognized means by which courts have
permitted a seemingly moot representative plaintiff to retain his
competency, thereby avoiding dismissal of the class suit for want of
competent representation. A closer scrutiny of the cases brings certain appurtenant considerations within perception. For instance, an
examination of the cases canvassed in section II indicates that the
early utilization of each of the devices employed by courts desiring
to circumvent a mootness conclusion occurred in cases involving a
constitutionally "suspect" classification. 71 It is further apparent
that early utilization of such devices exclusively in suits involving
"suspect" classifications ultimately led to their applicability
regardless of the presence of such classifications."' The trend by
such courts as recognize the various devices circumventive of mootness seems clearly to be in the direction of applying these devices
to class suits whether involving suspect classifications or not."1
Nevertheless, there persists a small number of decisions which
have applied traditional mootness principles and accordingly held
moot a representative plaintiff who has in fact become so.82 Such
cases are not distinguishable from those which comprise the conflicting view on the problem of the proper disposition of a class
action whose representative plaintiff has been rendered moot.
Rather, they constitute an entirely different approach to the
problem, based upon the precept that mootness is a doctrine of
78. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
79. "Suspect" classifiction is terminology borrowed from the equal protection vernacular. Such classifications have been held to include race, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184 (1964); alienage, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); and wealth, e.g.,
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). As to wealth as a "suspect" classification, see also San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 122 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). But cf. the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Powell in Rodriguez,
41i U.S. a 20.

The earliest case cited under subsection a involved a classification affecting wealth. See
Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The earliest case cited under subsection
b similarly involved a classification touching upon wealth. See Torres v. New York State
Dep't of Labor, 318 F. Supp. 1313 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Finally, the earliest case cited in
subsection c involved a classification affecting race. See Cypress v. Newport News Gen. &
Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967).
80. See Thomas v. Clarke, 54 F.R.D. 245 (D. Minn. 1971), and Davis v. Caldwell, 53
F.R.D. 373 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
81. See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
82. See section III supra.
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fundamental significance in our constitutional system, and should
not be eroded by judicially sanctioned devices. This particular approach to the problem, though definitely a minority position,8" nonetheless warrants some consideration because of its continued employment. It remains a possible basis of decision in all but a few
federal courts. 4
V.

A PROPOSAL

The cases enunciated in section II and III, though of unconsonant result, are alike in their recognition of the applicability of mootness to a class suit whose representative plaintiff has been rendered
moot. This recognition, while salient in the Hall and Watkins approach, is only implied by the contrary view through its employment of various schemes ostensibly to circumvent a conclusion of
mootness as to the entire class action. Logically, however, if such
adherence to the mootness doctrine is not dictated by its underlying purposes, then neither of the approaches to the present problem
is appropriate."
As indicated earlier,86 mootness is a function of the "case" or
"controversy" requirement of article III, section 2 of the Constitution. It is a justiciability concept invoked in order to prevent the
adjudication of suits devoid of a "real controversy, and adverse
interests."87 The mootness doctrine is grounded in a conviction that
the dialectical process of justice is dependent upon an adverseness
between litigants, which alone can insure a thorough presentation
of views. 8 The second commonly acknowledged purpose for the
doctrine, perhaps more of a practical consequence of the first, is
83. See Starrs, Continuing Complexities in the Consumer Class Action, 49 J. URB. L.
349, 360 (1972).
84. It appears that a few courts may have repudiated this view. Thus, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals decided both the Moss and Cypress cases and has not rendered a
decision following the Hall-Watkins approach. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided
the Jenkins and Smith cases, while no cases following the Hall-Watkins approach can be
found among its recent decisions. The District Court for the Southern District of New York
authored the Gaddis, Torres and Kelly decisions, though also deciding Heumann.
85. If the theory behind mootness does not dictate its application in the present context,
then the decisions in Hall and Watkins and their progeny are clearly unwarranted, and the
contrary view's invention of schemes to circumvent application of the doctrine would be both
inappropriate and unnecessary. See notes 93 and 94 infra and accompanying text.
86. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
87. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
88. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
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the desire to prevent the strains on an already overburdened docket
which the adjudication of moot cases would entail?"'
It is manifest that where the representative plaintiff, but not
the class, has been mooted, neither the very prerequisite for application of the mootness doctrine ' nor the purposes for the doctrine
dictate a conclusion of mootness as to the class. For, as between the
class and defendant, a "real controversy" persists, notwithstanding
the change in the representative plaintiff's competency. Further, a
conclusion of mootness would be inconsistent with the purposes
underlying the doctrine, since it would necessitate the dismissal of
a bona fide dispute, and would result in a greater strain upon an
already overburdened judicial system.'
Under such an analysis, it is evident that both of the general
approaches 2 to the problem of the proper disposition of a class
action whose representative plaintiff has been mooted, are inappropriate. The Hall and Watkins approach, which expressly recognizes
the applicability of mootness to a class whose representative plaintiff has been mooted, would be clearly aberrant. 3 And, the contrary
89. See note 19 supra and accompanying text. It should be noted that some have
advocated the complete abolition of the mootness concept. See, e.g., Singer, Justiciability
and Recent Supreme Court Cases, 21 ALA. L. REV. 229 (1968); Note, Mootness and Ripeness:
The Postman Always Rings Twice, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 867 (1965). The former article apparently bases this conclusion upon a fear that unless mootness and other justiciability concepts
are abolished or considerably eroded, the streets will perhaps be the only path for making
oneself heard. 21 ALA. L. REV. at 286. The latter Note reasoned that abolition of mootness
would be beneficial to the development of constitutional jurisprudence, since the creation of
ad hoc exceptions to the doctrine would no longer tax judicial ingenuity. 65 COLUM. L. REV.
at 875. Neither article evidenced any great concern for the propriety of such a conclusion viski-vis the "case" or "controversy" requirement of article III, section 2 of the Constitution.
It is submitted that the mootness doctrine has been and is an integral means of defining
the "case" or "controversy" requirement of article III, section 2. Its abolition would be
contrary to the ostensible intent of the framers of the Constitution that the federal judicial
power not be invoked for the adjudication of nondisputes.
9-". T
p.u-i
icd a PL
I-. :-.
....
r, .............
. • • ,,e _,_.
of a real controversy between adverse interests. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
91. The greater strain upon the judicial system would result from the probable reinstitution of the class suit by another plaintiff, thereby necessitating two conjurings of the
adjudicative process instead of the one which would be required if a court determined that
the class was not rendered moot.
92. See sections II and III supra.
93. In Hall, the Supreme Court dismissed a class action as moot where the representative plaintiffs but not the class had been so rendered by state legislative action. The Supreme
Court concluded that since the representative plaintiffs were mooted by the legislature's
action, the entire suit had thereby lost its character as a live controversy between adverse
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approach's invention of fictions to perpetuate the representative
plaintiff's competency in order to circumvent a conclusion of mootness as to the class, would be both inappropriate and unnecessary."
litigants, and accordingly dismissed. Hence, a class suit was scuttled for want of a competent
representative notwithstanding the fact that a real controversy as between the class and the
defendant persisted. Such a resolution is irreconcilable with the very purposes of the doctrine
by which this result was purportedly compelled, and overlooks the absence of even the factual
prerequisite to application of the mootness doctrine. The cardinal prerequisite for application
of the doctrine-the abs6hce of a real controversy between adverse interests-was lacking as
between the class and the defendant in Hall, despite the change of the representative plaintiffs' competency.
Further, the generally accorded purposes for the mootness doctrine did not dictate the
result in Hall. There existed between the class and defendant that adverseness which it is
the primary purpose of the mootness doctrine to insure. And, dismissal of the entire suit
doubtless undermined the second, more incidental, purpose of the doctrine-judicial economy; this because of the greater pressure upon the judicial system resulting from the probable
re-institution of the same class suit against defendant, represented by another plaintiff, and
necessitating two invocations of the adjudicative process instead of the one which would have
been required if the Court had determined that the class had not been rendered moot by the
mooting of its representatives. This analysis is equally applicable to Watkins.
94. Clearly the devices elucidated in section II, utilized to perpetuate a representative
plaintiff's competency and thereby that of the class he represents, are not rendered imperative by the doctrine whose circumvention was the reason for their creation. Where the representative plaintiff alone has been rendered moot, there continues as between the class and
defendant a real controversy, making a mootness conclusion as to the class completely unwarranted. Yet, it is a fear of this very result which has been the stimulus behind the creation of
the various fictions discussed in section II. If the impropriety of a mootness conclusion as to
the class in such a case be recognized, then such fictions must be viewed as unnecessary.
Thus, one fiction utilized by courts seeking to perpetuate a representative plaintiffs
competency and thereby to avoid a conclusion of mootness as to the class, is that of determining a representative plaintiff's competency at the commencement of the litigation. See
Moss v. Lane, Inc., 471 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1973). In Moss, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed a trial court ruling which had dismissed an entire class action after the representative plaintiff had been rendered moot. The court held that if the representative plaintiff were
a member of the class at the commencement of the action, and was then a competent litigant,
his subsequent mootness should not operate to render moot the action of the class. Such a
fiction was doubtless employed to avoid the trial court's assumption that the mooting of the
representative plaintiff moots the class. Yet, such strategy overlooks the fact that not even
the very purposes underlying the concept of mootness require that a class whose representative has been mooted itself be adjudged moot. For, as between the class and defendant a real
controversy persists, insuring a thorough presentation of views. And, the burden on the
judicial process would probably be less if a court refrains from dismissing an entire class
action as moot-since a dismissal of such an action will often lead to an immediate reinstitution of the same suit, represented by a new plaintiff, necessitating two invocations of
the judicial system. As a result, such a fiction is simply not necessary. There is no need for a
device circumventive of an inapposite doctrine.
The same analysis is equally applicable to each of the various other devices courts have
seized upon to avoid a mootness conclusion as to a class whose representative plaintiff has
become moot. See subsections b and c of section II, supra. In each case, the court was
applying a device with which it sought to avoid the employment of what must be considered
an inapplicable doctrine.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1974

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 [1974], Art. 6

352

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8

What is needed, then, is a recognition on the part of the courts of
the inappropriateness of a mootness conclusion as to a class whose
representative has been mooted, but which itself harbors interests
adverse to those of the defendant.
Admitting of such a conclusion, there remains the problem of
the proper disposition of the class action, for though the class is not
moot, it is incapable of suing without a representative.95 Two expedients appear feasible. First, having adopted the above reasoning as
to the nonmootness of the class, a court could permit a competent
member of the class to intervene in the role left vacant by the
mooting of the original named plaintiff. Intervention, a
comparatively recent innovation in Anglo-American legal procedure, " has been codified into federal jurisprudence by Rule 24 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.97 It has been employed by at least
two courts in the manner here suggested. In Washington v. Wyman," the representative plaintiff's interest in a class suit attacking a New York social services law had been mooted by defendant's
having voluntarily granted plaintiff the relief he individually
sought. Defendant thereafter claimed that the class action had become moot and was incapable of supporting additional plaintiffs by
intervention. The District Court for the Southern District of New
York rejected defendant's argument and granted to two applicants
the right to intervene pursuant to Rule 24. 99
95. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a),
96. 7A WRIGHT AND MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 464 (1972).
97. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) and (b) provide:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to
intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that
the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability
to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to
intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers a conditional
right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action
have a question of law or fact in common. When a party to an action relies for ground
of claim or defense upon any statute or executive order administered by a federal or
state governmental officer or agency or upon any regulation, order, requirement, or
agreement issued or made pursuant to the statute or executive order, the officer or
agency upon timely application may be permitted to intervene in the action. In
exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
98. 54 F.R.D. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
99. Id. at 270.
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The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recognized this same utilization of intervention in Norman v. Connecticut State Board of
Parole." "' Plaintiff Norman had filed a class action to enjoin the
state parole board from conducting revocation hearings without affording prospective parolees the right to counsel. During an appeal
from a district court order, outstanding criminal charges against
Norman were dropped, with the result that he no longer was representative of the class of prospective parolees which he purported to
represent. The court of appeals, refusing to summarily declare the
class action moot for want of a competent representative, remanded
the case with directions to dismiss only in the event that no class
member intervened within thirty days.
Courts accepting the suggestion that a conclusion of mootness
as to a class is inappropriate where the representative plaintiff, but
not the class, is mooted, will find Rule 24 a potent device for sustaining the viability of class actions whose representatives have been
rendered moot. This is particularly true when consideration is given
to the imperative of Rule 1 that the Federal Rules "be construed to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.',0,
A second method of dealing with an unmooted class whose
representative has been rendered moot, would be to recognize the
"dual capacity" of the representative plaintiff in a class action.
Such a plaintiff is representative not only of the interests of the
class, but also of his personal interest in the litigation. Under such
analysis, a conclusion of mootness as to the representative plaintiff's
individual interest would not necessitate his demise as representative of the class. This latter, coexistent representative capacity
100. 458 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1972).
101. FED. R. Cv. P. 1 provides:
These rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of a
civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity or in admiralty, with the
exceptions stated in Rule 81. They shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action.
In Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels ('orp., 38:3 U.S. 363 (1966), Mr. Justice Black observed:
The basic purpose of the Federal Rules is to administer justice through fair trials,
not through summary dismissals as necessary as they may be on occasion. . . . If
rules of procedure work as they should in an honest and fair judicial system, they
not only permit, but should as nearly as possible guarantee that bona fide complaints
be carried to an adjudication on the merits.
383 U.S. at 373.
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would persist, unaffected by the mooting of the plaintiff's personal
interests. And, adopting the current trend toward relaxing the requirements of Rule 23(a)' 2 of the Federal Rules that the representative plaintiff be a class member" 3 whose claim is typical of that of
the class," 4 seemingly nothing would bar the representative plaintiff
whose personal interests have been mooted from representing the
class.
The requirement of Rule 23(a)(4) that the representative be one
who will adequately protect the interests of the class'05 is similarly
satisfied, given the interpretation of that provision by recent
cases."" The emerging standard of "adequacy" of representation
clearly seems to embrace two characteristics: competency of the
representative's legal counsel 0 7 and a representative who will vigorously prosecute the action.'' Whether a representative plaintiff
102. See note 22 supra.
103. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a), in providing that "one or more members of a class may sue
or be sued as representative parties," lays down the requirement that a representative plaintiff be a member of the class he purports to represent. The trend seems to be one of liberalization of this requirement. See, e.g., Wymelenberg v. Syman, 54 F.R.D. 198 (E.D. Wis. 1972)
(as long as representative plaintiff's interests not antagonistic to those of the class, and where
the representative's counsel competently pursued the interests of the class, the representative
plaintiff is a competent representative); Thomas v. Clarke, 54 F.R.D. 245 (D. Minn. 1971)
(court refused to hold that where a representative plaintiff had been rendered moot, he should
be precluded from litigating for want of class membership); Arkansas Educ. Ass'n v. Board
of Educ., 446 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1971).
104. The requirement of Rule 23(a)(3) that the claims of the representative plaintiff be
typical of the claims of the class, has also been given an increasingly liberal interpretation,
many courts concluding that a mere lack of adverseness between the representative and the
class members is demonstrative of typicality of claims. See, e.g., Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp.,
52 F.R.D. 510 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Vernon J. Rockier & Co. v. Graphic Enterprises, Inc., 52
F.R.D. 335 (D. Minn. 1971); Rakes v. Coleman, 318 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Va. 1970); Weiss v.
Tenney Corp., 47 F.R.D. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
105. See note 22 supra.
106. See notes 107 and 108 infra and accompanying text.
107. See Johnson v. Georeia Highway Express. Inc-, 417 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir i.Prq); Ri~n
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968); Nolop v. Volpe, 333 F. Supp. 1364
(D.C.S.D. 1971); Page v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 332 F. Supp. 1060 (D.C.N.J. 1971); Mack v.
General Elec. Co., 329 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Rank v. Krug, 90 F. Supp. 773 (S.D. Cal.
1950). "It cannot be said that counsel the plaintiffs have chosen is lacking in character,
assiduity, energy or ability." 90 F. Supp. at 805.
108. See Hohmann v. Packard Instrument Co., 399 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1968); Rodriguez
v. Swank, 318 F. Supp. 289 (N.D. 11. 1970), aff'd mem., 403 U.S. 901 (1971); Epstein v. Weiss,
50 F.R.D. 387 (E.D. La. 1970). "The court must be assured that the representatives will
vigorously prosecute the rights of the class through qualified counsel." Id. at 392. Mersay v.
First Republic Corp., 43 F.R.D. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). "The primary criterion is the forthrightness and vigor with which the representative party can be expected to assert and defend the
interests of the members of the class ....
" Id. at 470.
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whose personal interest has been mooted satisfies the former element of "adequacy" depends upon the capabilities of his attorney.
It is unequivocal, however, that the plaintiff whose personal interests have been mooted, and who nevertheless desires to continue on
as representative of the class, satisfies the latter element. 0 9
109. Such a plaintiff's motivation for continuing on as representative of the class, may
be based either upon his own appraisal as to the probability that he will be affected by future
adverse effects, or upon an ideological interest. If plaintiff's motive is based upon the latter,
he displays the exceptional interest of pursuing litigation without prospect of personal gain.
This interest has been recognized by Professor Jaffe in his argument that "ideological" plaintiffs who challenge governmental action merely as concerned citizens, should be accorded
standing. See Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1968).
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